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A large body of literature investigates the 
productivity impacts of product and labor 
market imperfections, and of the anti-
competitive regulations establishing and 
supporting them (see Aghion and Howitt, 
2009, for a survey). This paper greatly 
extends the scope of previous studies that 
focus on the effect of product market 
regulation in non-manufacturing industries 
on the productivity of all industries (see 
Conway et al., 2006, Barone and Cingano, 
2011, Bourlès et al., 2013, and Cette, Lopez 
and Mairesse, 2013, among others).  
To our knowledge, this study is the first 
attempt to assess the consequences on 
productivity of anti-competitive regulations 
in product and labor markets through their 
effects on production prices and wages 
(Askenazy, Cette and Maarek, 2013, rely on 
similar assumptions to analyze the effects of 
anti-competitive regulations on income 
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 See Cette, Lopez, Mairesse (2014) for more details. 
shares).1  It does so by considering three 
channels through which regulations can 
impact multi-factor productivity (MFP): (i) 
the direct influence of product market 
regulations on the productivity of the 
regulated industry, through rent building; 
(ii) the indirect productivity impact of these 
regulations on the other industries , through 
rent sharing between regulated industries 
producing intermediate inputs and 
industries using these inputs; and (iii) the 
influence of labor market regulations on the 
rent sharing process between firms and 
workers. 
Our approach is theoretically grounded in 
the model developed by Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003), which “is built on two 
basic assumptions: monopolistic 
competition in the goods market, which 
determines the size of rents; and bargaining 
in the labor market, which determines the 
distribution of rents between workers and 
firm.” (pp. 879-880). In other words, firms 
can take advantage of the market power 
induced by product market anti-competitive 
regulations to charge higher production 
prices which generate rents. Workers can 
capture through higher wages a share of 
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these rents, which varies with their 
bargaining power, itself largely influenced 
by labor market regulations. Our empirical 
framework is an attempt to assess the 
productivity impact of regulations as 
mediated by their effects on production 
prices and wages.  
I. Data and Regression Equation 
Our analysis is grounded on a 
country*industry panel data sample of 
2,820 observations from 14 OECD 
countries (Austria, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States), from 1987 to 2007, and 
18 industries covering the manufacturing 
and market services industries, with the 
exception of the real estate industry. 
Our analysis basically relies on a 
regression equation assuming that product 
market imperfections in an industry 
generate higher production prices and rents, 
which have a “direct” impact on MFP in the 
same industry and an “indirect” impact on 
MFP in other industries. When industries 
are able to charge relatively high prices and 
benefit from large rents, they have fewer 
incentives to improve their efficiency and to 
innovate but also more financial resources 
to do so. We can thus expect that the direct 
impact on MFP could be either negative or 
positive. A negative sign may a priori seem 
more likely for non-manufacturing 
industries generally sheltered from foreign 
competition and often protected from 
national competition by product market 
regulations. But this may also be true for 
manufacturing industries when they are 
protected from foreign competition by high 
tariff barriers. High prices and rents in 
industries producing intermediate inputs 
(named upstream industries) may also be 
indicative of weaker incentives to improve 
efficiency and to innovate in industries 
using these intermediate inputs (named 
downstream industries), when the rents that 
downstream industries can generate are 
partly appropriated by upstream industries 
that have market power. Therefore, the 
expected indirect impact on MFP is 
unambiguously negative.  
Our regression equation also assumes that 
labor market imperfections may result in 
higher wages and lower profits, entailing a 
negative impact on the industry MFP. 
Employment protection legislation, 
professional agreements and standards, 
shortage of qualified workers, etc., 
contribute to higher wages, implying that 
rents, which could have been fully 
appropriated by firm owners and 
shareholders, are shared with workers. In 
turn, firms have fewer incentives and 
financial resources to improve their 
efficiency and to innovate. We can thus 
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expect that the wage indicator has a 
negative impact on MFP.  
Therefore, our main regression 
specification is the following: 
(1)  𝑚𝑓𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐷_𝑝𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾 𝐼_𝑝𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝜆 𝐽_𝑤𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝜃 𝑚𝑓𝑝𝑈𝑆 𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑐 + 𝜂𝑖
+ 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑖𝑡   
 
where 𝑚𝑓𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the multi-factor 
productivity, in logarithm, of country c, 
industry i and year t; 𝐷_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 , 𝐽_𝑤𝑐𝑖𝑡  
are respectively the production price 
indicators of direct and indirect impacts and 
the wage impact indicator; 𝜂𝑐, 𝜂𝑖 𝜂𝑡, 𝜂𝑐𝑖 and 
𝜂𝑐𝑡 denote fixed effects; 𝜀𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic random error of the 
regression. 
We include the log USA multi-factor 
productivity for industry in order to control 
mainly for exogenous technical changes at 
industry level. We choose the USA, which 
is at the world productivity frontier in most 
industries, as an appropriate reference 
country for our analysis. 
The direct price impact indicator 𝐷_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 is 
simply defined as the logarithm of the 
production price index relative to the GDP 
price index. The indirect price impact 
indicator is a composite indicator of 
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 We prefer to use the USA 2000 input-output table as a 
weighting fixed reference in the computation of the intensity-of-
use ratios to avoid endogeneity biases that might arise from 
potential correlations between the country*industry changes in 
production prices for the upstream 
industries: 𝐼_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑐𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑖
𝑗
𝑗  , where 
𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑖
𝑗
 is the intensity-of-use of intermediate 
inputs, defined as the ratio of the 
intermediate consumption of industry i 
from industry j over the production of 
industry i and measured on the basis of the 
2000 input-output table for the USA, taken 
as the country of reference in our analysis. 
Interacting the log upstream industry price 
with the intermediate input intensity-of-use 
ratio is an appropriate way of taking into 
account the intrinsic heterogeneity of 
upstream industry prices potential impact 
on downstream multi-factor productivity, 
assuming that the higher this ratio, the 
higher the impact of a given change in the 
upstream industry price.2  
The wage impact indicator is defined as 
𝐽_𝑤𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖, where 𝑤𝑐𝑡 is the 
country’s real wage index, in logarithm, and 
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖 is the share of labor costs in the 
production value of industry i for the USA 
in 2000.  As in the case of the indirect price 
impact indicator, we deem appropriate to 
interact the country’s wage with the labor 
cost share, assuming that the higher this 
labor cost share, the higher the impact of a 
given change in the low- and high-skilled 
industry wage.   
such ratios and productivity. For similar reasons: (i) we also 
exclude the intra-industry intermediate consumption in the 
computation; and (ii) the wage indicator presented further relies 
on the USA 2000 industry labour shares as fixed reference. 
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II. Estimation and main results 
A few words on the estimation strategy are 
useful. Entering 𝜂𝑐𝑖 in regression (1) is a 
necessity in the present context since our 
price and wage indicators do not measure 
absolute levels but are computed from price 
and wage indices normalized to be equal to 
1 in a given reference year. Including also 
the country*year fixed effects 𝜂𝑐𝑡  protects 
against various sources of potential 
estimation biases, for example simultaneity 
biases due to changes in prices and wages in 
response to country productivity shocks.3 
All the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%. The direct 
and indirect price impact and wage impact 
indicators have a negative effect on 
productivity, as well as the wage impact 
indicator, with elasticities of about 0.4, -0.5 
and -2.1 respectively. These estimated 
elasticities are not statistically different 
when the impact indicators are included 
separately in the regression (see Cette, 
Lopez and Mairesse, 2014). 
As a variant of regression (1), we also 
consider a specification that distinguishes 
between the impacts of manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing production prices. This 
distinction is important in order to compare 
our results with previous studies that focus 
only on non-manufacturing industries, as 
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 We also implement the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator, 
which has the advantage of ensuring that the estimated elasticities 
most anti-competitive regulations are 
concentrated on these industries in OECD 
countries. As we expect the impact of labor 
market rigidities on wages to depend on 
worker skills, our alternative specification 
also distinguishes between the impacts of 
low- and high-skilled wages. 
All six estimated elasticities for this 
alternative specification are again negative 
and statistically very significant. We find 
very large and significant differences 
between the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing direct and indirect price 
impact estimated elasticities and the low 
and high-skilled wage impact estimated 
elasticities. The direct impact estimated 
elasticity for non-manufacturing industries 
is twice that for manufacturing industries 
(about -0.8 versus -0.4) and the indirect 
impact estimated elasticity is ten times 
higher (about -5.0 versus -0.5). The wage 
impact estimated elasticity for high-skilled 
workers is twice that for low-skilled 
workers (-3.0 versus -1.7). 
III. Simulations of the potential impact 
of structural reforms 
The estimation results for regression (1) 
cannot unambiguously be interpreted in 
terms of productivity impacts of anti-
competitive regulations in the product and 
are not biased by short-term correlations between the variables 
and the idiosyncratic error 𝜀𝑐𝑖𝑡 , and that we can consider them as 
long-term parameters. 
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labor markets, and thus cannot directly be 
used to assess the potential effects of 
structural reforms in these markets. 
Moreover, despite the great care we have 
taken to avoid specification error biases in 
estimating our regression model, it is indeed 
important to confirm that production prices 
and wages indirectly capture the impacts of 
regulations. We address these two issues by 
calibrating them in relation to the OECD 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
indicators on the one hand and to the OECD 
Non-Manufacturing Regulation (NMR) and 
Harmonized Tariff (HT) indicators on the 
other (note that the HT indicator is available 
only for manufacturing industries). The 
OECD indicators are constructed on the 
basis of very detailed information on laws, 
rules and market, country, industry settings. 
They have the advantage of being directly 
related to underlying policies and 
considered to a major extent as exogenous 
to productivity developments (for more 
information on these indicators see Conway 
and Nicoletti, 2006, and OECD, 2013). 
The calibration we have performed simply 
amounts to four distinct OLS projections on 
the OECD indicators: two for non-
manufacturing and manufacturing 
production prices on the NMR and HT 
indicators respectively, and two for low- 
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 The simulation results presented in Figure 1 mobilize the 
estimates of the alternative productivity specification that 
and high-skilled wages separately on the 
EPL indicators. The estimated coefficients 
corroborate our hypotheses that changes in 
production prices and wages are positively 
and significantly related to changes in the 
OECD regulation indicators. 
By means of this calibration we can 
interpret and assess the estimates of the 
productivity regression in terms of an 
illustrative simulation of the potential long-
term MFP gains by country. This 
simulation is an ex-ante assessment of the 
long-term effects of hypothetical regulatory 
reforms. We suppose for the purpose of this 
simulation that the “lightest practice” 
regulations observed in 2013 could be 
immediately enforced in all industries, 
where the “lightest practice” is defined as 
the average of the three lowest levels of 
regulations in the fourteen countries of our 
sample. Such a pervasive and simultaneous 
switch to “lightest practice” regulations is 
thus an overly extreme illustration of 
structural reforms in product and labor 
markets, which of course overlooks the 
numerous and substantial institutional and 
political difficulties of implementation. The 
simulation results are presented in Figure 
1.4 
distinguishes between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
production price impacts as well as low- and high-skilled wage 
impacts. 
6 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. LONG TERM MFP IMPACT OF ADOPTION OF THE 
‘LIGHTEST PRACTICES’ 
 
The MFP long-term gains are on average 
of about 4.4%, but vary widely across 
countries: below 1.5% in the two countries 
with the lowest level of regulations: the 
United Kingdom (1.1%) and the United 
States (1.3%), and above 5% in the four 
countries with the highest level of 
regulations: Germany (5.8%), France 
(5.9%), Italy (6.2%) and the Czech 
Republic (7.0%). Both product and labor 
market reforms contribute significantly to 
MFP gains (2.5% and 1.9% on average, 
respectively). The former stems mainly 
from the indirect channel: average MFP 
gains from the indirect impact of NMR and 
HT are about twice those of the direct 
impact (1.6% and 0.9%, respectively). 
The average and country simulated MFP 
impacts of a sudden shift to the lightest 
regulatory practices shown in Figure 1 are 
long-term gains. On the basis of a 
complementary approximate analysis of the 
respective dynamic adjustments of the 
changes in MFP, production prices and 
wages and OECD indicators, we can get an 
idea of the overall speed of progression 
towards the long-term equilibrium. The 
results are presented in Figure 2 for six 
European countries and the United States. 
They suggest that on average about 30% of 
the long-term MFP gains could be achieved 
after six years on average. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. DYNAMIC MFP GAINS FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE 
‘LIGHTEST PRACTICES’ – FOR A SUBSAMPLE OF COUNTRIES 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The simulation presented above suggests 
that nearly all countries, in particular 
European countries, can expect significant 
gains in multi-factor productivity over time 
from economic policies reforming anti-
competitive regulations on the product and 
labor markets.  
Our estimates and simulations suffer 
clearly from various weaknesses, due in 
particular to the data limitation. They 
should be taken with particular caution and 
the policy indications that they suggest 
considered as tentative. In particular, we do 
not take into consideration in our analysis 
the substantial institutional, political and 
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social difficulties that the implementation 
of such ambitious structural reform 
programs usually encounter. 
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